While not every libertarian agrees that self-ownership should be an axiom, most libertarians maintain that there should be a moral ought which translates roughly to "people avoid interference with the agency of others except in rare cases."
I assert that absolute and unbounded exclusive property rights are not necessarily compatible with continued self-ownership or the rights to continued self-ownership of more than one distinct agent. This applies even if the unbounded exclusive property rights do not extend to opportunities currently in use by others (for instance, the bodies of others) so long as other agents will need those opportunities to survive.
This assertion can be shown with math, physics, and logic though the physics I'm using are Newtonian.
If
Then
Unbounded exclusive rights in natural opportunities is not necessarily compatible with the continued self-ownership of more than one distinct agent in cases where the property is obtained in natural opportunities which another agent has not yet claimed ownership of but will need to survive.
The only way to avoid a conflict is for an agent to obtain enough natural opportunities to continuously sustain life before any other agent makes a claim. The newly born find everything claimed by other agents. While it can be said that their parents should not have created them, moral responsibility cannot lie with the newly born.
Furthermore, a common understanding in moral philosophy is that ought implies can. I believe this can be rectified in a universe without free will by modifying it to ought implies can see a way to. That means that and end must be seen as reachable along a graph of actions from the current state to be considered possible. Each step in the graph has a cost of action and makes reaching an end less probable. Such probability is expressed as reasonableness and one can further modify the term to introduce this fuzziness by saying ought implies can see a reasonable way to.
If it is not the case that it is possible, likely, or reasonable then it can be dismissed as an unreasonable expectation. Since there is no way to guarantee the compatibility of descriptive self-ownership and unbounded exclusive rights in natural opportunities in systems with more than one distinct agent, there is no way for it to be an ought in all situations; there is no way for more than one distinct agent to simultaneously have guaranteed rights and unbounded exclusive property rights in such a system.
Essentially, if one were to attempt to respect such a right, it could require the death of the respecter at least making the right of self-ownership impossible. If one were to disrespect such a right to maintain a right of self-ownership, it would again show the incompatibility.